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Political Stability in Divided Societies:
A Rational± Institutional Explanation
HANS KEMAN*
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Analyses of consociationalism and corporatism are based, more often than not,
on descriptive case studies. These concepts are considered to explain the
stability of the political systems, where one would expect that con¯ ict and
stalemate in democratic decision-making were the rule rather than the excep-
tion. In this article an attempt is made to develop a more general argument,
based on the idea of a structure-induced equilibrium, to analyse institutional
adaptation and change in plural societies. Central to this approach, which I label
`rational institutionalism’ , are the concepts of `room to manoeuvre’ for political
and societal actors, on the one hand, and the `feasibility of political choice’
allowing for more space to develop positive sum results for all involved, on the
other hand. This argument is ® rst elaborated a priori and then applied to Dutch
consociationalism and corporatism. These empirical illustrations demonstrate
that a logic of interaction has been developed in the Netherlands, which is not
a feature of the Dutch case alone, but can be understood as a form of
institutional adaptation and change. This institutional approach can be con-
sidered as an analytical instrument to explain political stability under differing
circumstances cross-nationally and across time in democracies.
A central paradox of parliamentary democracy is its ability to combine ¯ exibility
and change with an underlying stability. Various comparative explanations have
been advanced to account for this (see, for instance, Daalder and Mair 1983; Lane
and Ersson 1994). Many of them are ¯ awed, however, by their failure to
systematically relate the type and occurrence of political action to those institutions
that affect collective decision-making in pluralist democracies (Shepsle 1995,
281±2; Scharpf 1998; Olsen 1998).
Since the 1970s two concepts have been developed in the ® eld of comparative
politics, which attempt to break away from the mainstream literature on the causes
and consequences of political stability and democratic performance in plural
societies (eg Lipset 1963; Dahl 1971; Powell 1982; Almond, Powell and Mundt
1993). These challenge the general argument that plural societies, characterised by
strong political divisiveness, would produce unstable politics and volatile types of
governance. It is argued instead that patterns of institutionalised behaviour could
* This article has been discussed at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) and the
Research School for the Social Sciences (RSSS/Canberra). I am grateful for the helpful comments of
the discussants and in particular for the comments of Ian Budge (Essex) and Philippe C. Schmitter (EUI,
Florence).
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and would emerge under these circumstances that counteract the feared ill-effects
of societal heterogeneity and political divisiveness. These alternative explanations
incorporate concepts like consociationalism (Lijphart 1975, 1977; Daalder 1974;
Steiner 1974; Lehmbruch 1967) and corporatism (Lehmbruch 1979; Schmitter
1981; Katzenstein 1985; Scharpf 1987). These concepts claim that pluralism is not
the only, nor even the best, explanation of the institutional performance of
democracies. On the contrary, it is argued that the pure concept of democratic
pluralism is inadequate to understand the political behaviour of the relevant actors
and consequent democratic performance of socially divided societies (Offe 1979;
Weaver and Rockman 1993; Keman 1997b).
Consociationalism and corporatism attempt to explain the relation between
societal con¯ ict and political consensus by means of institutionalised patterns of
collective choice. Institutions are de® ned as sets of rules which occur in social
practice in the form of appropriate modes of conduct for political and societal
actors. This is particularly important if and when the actors involved are having
con¯ icts that may well lead to recurrent behaviour that complies to those rules and
jeopardise political stability (Ostrom 1990; Scharpf 1998). These institutions, ie the
formal and informal `rules of the political game’ , have emerged under conditions
of societal strife which tended to produce a stalemate between the con¯ icting actors
in a parliamentary democracy (Steinmo, Thelan and Longstreth 1992, 2; Keman
1997b, 10).
Managing these political crises appeared not only possible but in due course
produced standard operating procedures accepted by most actors involved, over and
over again (Lijphart 1977; March and Olsen 1989). It was exactly such develop-
ments which have been explained by the concepts of consociationalism and
corporatism. However, both models of collective decision-making are merely
developed from descriptive analyses of speci® c cases (eg The Netherlands,
Belgium, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland; see, for instance, Rothstein, in
Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992, 51±3; Tsebelis 1990, 162±3; Keman 1993a,
157±9). There has been some doubt, therefore, whether or not these explanations
can travel across countries and time, as has been claimed by their protagonists
(in particular by Lijphart 1977, 1989; Lehmbruch 1984).
One of the aims of this paper is therefore to discover the extent to which
consociationalism and corporatism, orÐ more broadlyÐ systems of associational
interest intermediation (Lehmbruch 1998) work under changing circumstances and
differing conditions and are still capable of furthering consensus where con¯ ict
appears inevitable in pluralist democracies. This requires us to develop a more
systematic approach to analyse the underlying mechanisms that may well explain
the effective operation of consociationalism and corporatism across countries and
time. We need to develop a conceptual framework of collective decision-making
regarding societal problems-cum-con¯ icts that is not primarily based on path-
dependent accounts alone. Path dependency is an approach to demonstrate the
discrete working of institutions that have historically emerged in a (set of)
countries. Such an analysis is useful to understand the constraints for action and
subsequent choice within a system per se (see Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth
1992, 28; Putnam 1993, 7±8). Instead my point of departure will be that collective
actors tend to pursue societal interests rationally through actions that are shaped by
existing or evolving institutions. Hence, political action is not only considered as
being determined by formal rules, but is also in¯ uenced by the preferences of the
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actor involved. In addition to rules-for-use, one must take into account the existing
or emerging rules-in-use (see Laver 1986; Ostrom 1990; HeÂritier 1998). This kind
of `rational institutionalism’ may well account for the paradox of con¯ ict
and consensus in various societies with differently institutionalised modes of
decision-making (Shepsle 1995; Scharpf 1998).
In what follows I shall ® rst develop my argument concerning rational institution-
alism by discussing brie¯ y the principles of `rational choice’ and `new institution-
alism’ as an analytical approach to political action. I shall then introduce a
conceptual framework which is intended to capture the relationships between actors
in con¯ ict and the consensus that is achieved. This raises, and hopefully answers,
questions as to how and to what extent institutions matter in terms of problem-solv-
ing. Finally I shall try to demonstrate that such a general approach is applicable by
analysing the Netherlands under conditions of consociationalism and corporatism.
The Paradox of Con¯ ict and Consensus: Political Decisions and Societal
Problem-solving
One of the central questions in political science is about the way in which societal
con¯ icts can be constructively channelled into problem-solving. Con¯ icts appear to
the actors concerned as a zero-sum game. If societal con¯ icts are indeed `solved’
in an unilateral and one-sided fashion (for instance, by ignoring substantial
minorities due to simple majority voting), this will in the long run, according to the
logic of game theory, inevitably lead to a situation of a sub-optimal outcomes for
all participants (albeit, of course, in a different degree across the population in a
society). In formal political theory this situation has been modelled by the
(well-known) Prisoner’ s Dilemma. Even where situations are not so con¯ ictual
sub-optimal outcomes may emerge as a result of `free riding’ . A consequence of
political action based on the self-interest of collective actors (Ostrom 1990, 38;
Scharpf 1998, 46±50; Laver 1986).
This explanation underlines the so-called micro/macro-paradox of politics and
society: rational actors pursuing their interests by means of societal interaction
whilst being dependent on others, must act strategically within the rules of the
political game to achieve their individual utility. However, this process tends to
yield optimal results (instead of maximum pay-offs) for all actors involved.
1
This
paradox becomes apparent in societal con¯ icts, if and when politicised (ie forming
part of the political agenda subject to the democratic rules of decision-making). By
de® nition, the public outcome cannot satisfy all the preferences of the individuals
or groups concerned. In other words, political decision-making is inevitably
characterised by the micro/macro-paradox. It is literally paradoxical, since the
democratic polity can only produce public goods (measures and rewards) to satisfy
individual desires (Taylor 1987; Ostrom 1990, 15±18; Laver 1997). Yet, the
1 Note that the use of the term `optimum’ is different here from what is meant by a Pareto-optimal
solution, ie the `social welfare’ function in social choice literature (see Mueller 1989, 384 ff.), nor does
it point to the application of (economic) norms of `ef ® ciency’ and `effectivity’ as employed by the
Virginian school approach to problems of `public choice’ (see Lane 1993, 150 ff.). Essential to our
understanding is whether or not the actual outcome of the political process is acceptable to all concerned,
rather than that it represents the perfect result one can theoretically construct, either on the micro-level
(ie social choice) or on the macro-level (ie public choice). As far as `choice’ is involved, we mean political
choices shaping mandatory policies in a society by means of public goods (see Scharpf 1998).
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existence and working of formal and informal democratic institutions, which aid
consensus formation, are essential for understanding to what extent this is possible
or not.
An example of this effect of institutions is the majority rule governing decision-
making in parliament. This could lead to stalemates in decision-making, eg `voting
cycles’ in democracies (Mueller 1989, 63±89). In practice, these situations have
been avoided in two ways: (1) by means of compromises among decision-making
actors (hence, exchange in order to cooperate); (2) by adapting formal procedures,
introducing additional rules concerning agenda-setting and rank-ordering of issues
to decide on.
2
Consociationalism must be seen as a process of redistributing certain
policy preferences by means of trading off. The underlying mechanism is an ability
to avoid a stalemate or voting cycles without sub-optimal outcomes for the actors
involved.
Another example of the paradoxical effects of democratic institutions is given by
Mancur Olson. If, indeed, political and societal actors behave rationally, then it
follows that individuals will not participate in collective action if they expect that
the related pay-offs will come their way anyhow. This may well lead to less
societal cooperation and to more self-interested behaviour (and often to free riding).
According to Olson (1982) this is due, in part, to individual rationality and, in part,
to the (inherent) working of democratic institutions. Avoiding such a situation
would imply either a complete overhaul of the democratic institutions, or the
incorporation of several `distributional coalitions’ into an encompassing institu-
tional arrangement under the aegis of the democratic state (Olson 1986). In fact, the
latter option is the only feasible one, and this impliesÐ given the constitutional
design of a liberal democracyÐ that the extent to which its decision rules allow for
defection, obstruction and thus non-cooperation between societal actors and
the state should be taken into account in terms of reducing and subsequently
accommodating this type of self-interested behaviour (cf Scharpf 1998, 56).
This line of reasoning is exactly the foundation of those who see corporatism as
associational interest intermediation. This model represents an alternative to the
perverse consequences of the pluralist politics of interest intermediation as envis-
aged by Olson on the basis of exchange relations (Keman, Paloheimo and Whiteley
1987; Colomer 1996; Czada 1998). Hence, de® ciencies of democratic polities are
in practice solved by adapting and extending institutions to reduce con¯ ict in
democratic society.
Both consociationalism and corporatism can be seen as examples of additive
institutionalisation. These modes of collective decision-making are in fact a
combination of formal rules, on the one hand, with informal procedures, on the
other. This observation underlines the need to develop empirically based models of
exchange relations between societal and political actors which specify the patterns
of interaction between institutions and the political choices made by actors. Taking
the micro/macro-paradox as a point of departure with regard to societal problem-
solving is a valuable approach in delineating the extent to which institutions may
facilitate coordination and regulation of those problems. Without institutional
devices, these situations cannot be solved adequately, the ill-effects of the micro/
2
It is precisely these practices which have been described in consociationalism by Lijphart (1975) and
which laid the foundation of his model of consensus democracy as opposed to the `majoritarean’ types
of democracy (Lijphart 1984).
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macro-paradox of individual interests and preferences cannot be reduced, nor can
the resulting societal con¯ icts be resolved and subsequent political consensus be
attained (Keman 1996). The ® rst assignment is then to develop a conceptual
approach that speci® es how and to what extent interactions between institutions and
actors are relevant in producing a stable political order from the process of political
decision-making and related outcomes.
The Interactions between Actors and Institutions
The extent to which there is an institutionalised political order of society that is
capable of producing a balance between con¯ ict and consensus, which is enduring
and produces a minimal loss to any individual or group within a society, is what
I call a structure-induced equilibrium capable of explaining the relative stability of
the political order. This concept, introduced by Shepsle (1995, 284; see also
Colomer 1996, 4), points to a situation in which there is no alternative choice
allowed by the rules of procedure and rules of the game available to the actors who
possess veto power or voting power. In this way the existence and working of the
rules of a political community shape the room to manoeuvre for policy choices. The
concept of a structure-induced equilibrium combines institutional features of a
polity with the strategic behaviour of actors who have more or less con¯ icting
preferences. Studying the development and working of political institutionsÐ which
structure the behavioural patterns of the actors involvedÐ is thus crucial to a better
understanding of the kind of equilibrium that is tenable under conditions of strong
societal con¯ ict (HeÂritier 1998; Keman 1997a).
Institutional arrangements regulate the behaviour of political and societal actors
who are considered to be both rational and interdependent in a democratic polity.
The concept of political order can be conceived as consisting of three dimensions:
politics, polity and policy (Powell 1982; Scharpf 1987; Keman 1993b, 43±7).
Politics is the political process: actors (mostly aggregates of individuals organised
in parties, associations, or interest groups) interact with each other when they have
con¯ icting interests or preferences regarding societal problems that are character-
ised by a de® ciency of self-regulation. The process of solving those problems
becomes visible through the institutions that have emerged in order to facilitate
con¯ ict resolution. Institutions are meant to develop coalescence and to achieve a
consensus among con¯ icting actors through developing alternative preferences.
These alternative preferences represent, in theory, the solution, ie that alternative
which is acceptable to all concerned and enhances cooperation. Institutions mani-
fest themselves in the rules of the game in a society. This game is then directed by
the existing framework of rules or the polity. Institutions are considered to be either
formal, like, for instance, those enshrined in a constitution, which can be enforced
by means of authority, or as informal rules, ie rules evolving over time are
respected and followed as a code of conduct by most actors involved. As a result,
non-compliance or defection leads to sub-optimal results for the player or the
exclusion from the game. The ® nal result of this process can be observed by means
of policy choices which re¯ ect the extent to which con¯ icts have been resolved
(or not) in a way that it is conducive to an equilibrium.
The urge to solve societal con¯ icts and thus the need for effective rules which
facilitate a political consensus among contestants can be understood as follows:
® rst, rules reduce uncertainty among the actors involved, hence they can act
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strategically with an eye to optimal solutions; second, rules provide room for
exchange and bargaining for those problems that are described by Ostrom (1990)
as `common pool requirements’ (in order to avoid a `tragedy of the commons’ ) on
the one hand, and as `public problems’ on the other; third, policy-making by means
of consensus and concertation may well decrease external costs to a society and
thus the perverse effects of free riding. The options chosen or decided upon for
political action to solve a problem are what we shall call policy formation. This
process is equivalent to what others would call state intervention or the `authoritat-
ive allocation of values in a society’ . Actions of the state, or a related allocating
agency, are in this conceptualisation of the `political’ viewed as relatively indepen-
dent from societal interests (Skocpol 1985, 45). That is to say, political action, ie
the relation between politics and policy-making, requires a degree of autonomy in
order to be feasible and effective. It is precisely the existence and working of
institutions which makes this possible.
This abstract description of the political process can be observed almost every
day: for example, pollution, unemployment or crime are public problems which
become recognised as political issues (by parties and the media). Given the nature
of the problem and the societal response, on the one hand, and the position taken
up by politicians, on the other, policy action will follow (nb: non-decisions or
non-action are also policy formation!). Yet, the extent to which the `public’
recognises that this result is the outcome of the (democratic) political process is
then also an indication of its democratic performance, ie the perception of an
effective political order.
This interactive process between political institutions and rational actors will be
our theoretical point of departure in order to assess the way in which societal
con¯ icts and interdependent choices of actors reach the political arena and how
subsequent decision-making takes place. In the next section I shall elaborate the
underlying mechanisms which motivate and drive actors into action as well as limit
their actual scope for action. This refers to the concepts of `feasibility of political
choice’ of actors, on the one hand, and the `institutional room to manoeuvre’ of
actors, on the other (Keman 1998). Both concepts are crucial for understanding
how and when a structure-induced equilibrium is attainable.
Rational Institutionalism and Political Action
In recent times institutionalism has been revived by comparative analysis of the
relation between politics and policy formation (March and Olsen 1989; Budge and
Keman 1990; Scharpf 1987, 1992; Putnam 1993; Czada, HeÂritier and Keman
1998). This type of research often provides empirical evidence demonstrating that
political institutions add signi® cantly to the understanding of the cross-national and
inter-temporal variation in the governing capacity of democracies (Keman,
Paloheimo and Whiteley 1987; Scharpf 1992; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth
1992; Weaver and Rockman 1993; Schmidt 1996).
The question is whether political decisions and actions are more adequately
understood in terms of intentional behaviour directed by individual preferences or
as the outcome of institutional arrangements and related procedures. On the level
of politics and policies, our concern here, individually guided behaviour is not
primarily relevant. By de® nition political actors perform at the meso-level of
society this level of (organised) action or forms of (political) participation. The
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individual voter counts less than the aggregated votes and the way they are
translated into representation. The single demonstrator and his/her slogan has less
of an effect than the extent to which the slogan is shared by others and is
transformed into collective action that is relevant to the political arena.
3
This point
of view also implies that we need ® rst to discuss the tenability of the notion of
(individual) `preferences’ on the level of politics (Laver 1997, 20).
First of all, preferences are not only manifold, but are also shaped by social and
economic conditions. Second, preferences are not `given’ but are strongly
in¯ uenced by their sociocultural environment (Elster 1979). Third, under conditions
of societal con¯ ict it is better to speak of `needs’ than of preferences (Laver 1986).
In politics and the related process of political choice, individual `needs’ show up
through the actions of organised actors. The various positions related to `needs’ and
taken up by relevant collective actors with respect to societal con¯ icts guide their
behaviour and will drive them into political action. However, actors live in an
interdependent world and subsequently have to take the behaviour of other actors
into account. This implies that a political actor, representing a rationally de® ned
and rank-ordered notion of `needs’ underlying societal con¯ ict, will often forego a
short-term gain in order to attain an agreement that is both enduring and closer to
his/her own goals in view of improving public welfare (HeÂritier 1998). Political
actors represent an aggregate of individual preferences and a collectively shared
and rank-ordered de® ned set of (urgent) needs, as well as operate in an inter-
dependent world ® lled with other rational actors, implies that political decision-
making is characterised by the feasibility of political choice of each actor involved.
Thus, optimal goal achievement directs behaviour in the political game of decision-
making rather than maximalisation of interests.
4
Institutions are seen in this light
not just as constraints but also as opportunities to enhance stable outcomes.
The ® rst concept essential for understanding the relation between con¯ ict and
consensus in terms of concerted political action (politics) and collective decision-
making (policy-formation) is: the feasibility of political choice. Every (organised)
political actor participating in collective decision-making will work from a rank-
ordered set of `needs’ whose feasibility is, however, also dependent on the
(rational) behaviour of other actors. If two (or more) parties compete in the same
realm of `needs’ then two possibilities to come to an agreement emerge (assuming
a competitive situation): either on the basis of complementary or of parallel needs.
5
3
Hence there is a `collective action’ problem that precedes much of the successful organisation of
political action (Olson 1965). While this may be a problem for the political actor per se, it is not our
concern here. I investigate political actors and their interdependent relations and assume that this type
of actor represents the intentions of its followers. See also Laver and Scho® eld (1990, Appendix A,
217±44).
4 This means by giving away maximalisation that the concept of rationality becomes quite open-ended
or even obscure, yet in my opinion the pure concept of economic rationality obscures most of political
action. Unlike the notion of the `market’ where one can trade utilities on the level of the individual and
on equal footing, the political `arena’ is fundamentally different: politics is about establishing a balance
between con¯ ict and consensus, which is not the same as an equilibrium that is construed by an `invisible
hand’ , but by regulation and the authoritative allocation of values rather than the anonymous exchange
of utilities (see also North 1990; Mueller 1989; Scharpf 1992).
5
Complementarity is a situation in which two functionally different actors demand identical measures
to achieve a societal situation that meets their respective needs (eg organised employees and employers
requiring policy initiatives to restore or stimulate economic growth). Parallelism is the situation in which
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Complementary needs will further the formation of strategic coalitions, whereas
parallelism will enhance cooperative strategies. If these situations occur it may well
enlarge the feasibility of political choices (Czada 1998). If not, then agreements are
more dif® cult to reach and require extensive bargaining. The extent to which a
situation of optimal decision-making and concurrent policy-formation may occur is,
however, dependent on the institutional room to manoeuvre available to the actors
involved.
A number of authors have pointed out, quite correctly, that political and societal
actors operate within different arenas of decision-making in a political system. In
a democratic society, for instance, parties are active in civil society and in
parliament and government simultaneously. Interest groups, on the other hand, are
mainly based in civil society and seek access to the political arena through various
channels (eg the bureaucracy or advisory boards, etc; Putnam 1993; Woldendorp
1995) Hence, it is important to know which actor has access to which arena. Each
arena has its own rules, which are almost always both of a formal and of an
informal nature. These rule con® gurations de® ne the institutional room to
manoeuvre of the actors involved. Moreover, as these actors often take on roles in
more than one arena, this may well affect the relative opportunities of an actor,
andÐ vice versaÐ limit others in their room to manoeuvre as they too have to play
multiple roles (this relates to the epiphenomenon of `nested games’ ; see Tsebelis
1990; Ostrom 1990). In short, a set of institutions, or rule con® gurations, can be
considered as opportunity structures for action.
Finally, all institutions are created by political actors at some point in time. They
re¯ ect the modes of interaction between the interdependent actors involved. Formal
rules are here seen as conditions under which decision-making takes place and
which set the limits for rational man in maximising his own `needs’ . Informal rules,
on the other hand, de® ne the options available to each actor, given their potential
for defection and vetoing. Together both types of rule indicate the room to
manoeuvre available to each political actor involved from an interdependent
perspective.
Political institutions are thus de® ned as sets of rules that shape (at least in part)
the strategic behaviour of interdependent political actors and facilitate the process
of decision-making, inducing the furthering of public welfare. Rules de® ne the
room to manoeuvre for the participating actors, whose rank-ordered needs in turn
de® ne the feasibility of political choice. Both these analytical concepts offer thus
the possibility of investigating the opportunities and limitations available in a
society to contain con¯ ict and to create consensus. The more the `needs’ of
the interdependent actors involved are of a complementary or parallel nature, the
greater the likelihood of cooperation and compromise between them in solving
con¯ icts (Scharpf 1998; Keman 1997b).
In the next section this rational institutionalist approach will be applied to the
concepts of consociationalism and corporatism in the Netherlands. This exercise is
meant to show that the conceptual framework discussed in this section can be
applied to a concrete case. The analysis will demonstrate that the underlying
Footnote continued
separately organised actors with similar needs operate within the political system (eg political parties
with a comparable stance on the welfare state, but within a different ordering of needs which are to be
met ® rst). Both situations can occur simultaneously.
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mechanisms that have produced a structure-induced equilibrium in the Netherlands
have wider theoretical implications beyond simply explaining the Dutch case
per se.
Consociationalism and Corporatism Explained by Rational Institutionalism
The extent to which the so-called paradox of con¯ ict and consensus can be solved
depends by and large on the way the relevant sociopolitical actors are able to
operate rationally. This capability is in turn in¯ uenced by the institutional environ-
ment in which the political action takes place. The two basic concepts of rational
institutionalismÐ the `feasibility of political choice’ of the actors involved and their
actual `room to manoeuvre’ Ð will be applied below to consociationalism and
corporatism and in the Netherlands to demonstrate the viability of the national±
institutionalist approach (Keman 1993a, 1996).
The rationale of both modes of collective decision-making according to its
protagonists (viz Daalder 1974; Lijphart 1977, 1989; Lehmbruch and Schmitter
1982; Lehmbruch 1998), is that it preserves the existing political order, ie stability,
by means of democratic institutions, although the societal structure of the speci® c
cases they study tends to generate and to continue con¯ icts. They also argue that
consociationalism and corporatism often perform better than many other types of
parliamentary arrangements in terms of political stability and public welfare (see,
for example, Lijphart 1977, ch. 4; Katzenstein 1985, ch. 1). I shall analyse
consociationalism and corporatism a priori in terms of the political behaviour
displayed, when con¯ ict appears predominant and governance by consensus almost
impossible.
Consociational Democracy
In plural societies with several cleavages, the related political con¯ icts cannot be
overcome easily by means of majoritarean rule. Therefore the existing political±
institutional framework for decision-making needs to be adapted or even changed.
If not, a situation would occur with `civil strife rather than democracy. What these
societies need is a democratic regime that emphasises consensus instead of
opposition that includes rather than excludes’ (Lijphart 1977, 23).
However, the liberal democratic rule con® guration as it is organised by means
of an electoral system and a mode of collective decision-making (by means of
simple majorities) appears to misrepresent a (societally segmented) population and
is often bound to make non-decisions as a result of voting cycles created by larger
minorities in parliament. In short, the formal system is at odds with the way the
existing cleavage structure and related political interests within the Netherlands are
organised and represent their needs. This impliesÐ from a rational institutionalist
perspectiveÐ that the sociopolitical actors (ie parties) are in need of room to
manoeuvre to negotiate in such a way that the formal institutions do not constrain
positive-sum actions. Yet each actor, interdependent as they are, must seek
opportunities to pursue their feasible set of political choice in order to improve their
own welfare as well as the public welfare simultaneously. In terms of `needs’ , each
and every actor thus must be able to recognise the complementarity and parallelism
in the `needs’ pursued by themselves and by other participating actors. In addition,
each actor must be convinced that these preferences can somehow be realised in the
(near) future in an optimal way.
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Three conditions to facilitate this process can be discerned in the consociational
model (Lijphart 1977; Lehmbruch 1984). First, cooperative behaviour can only be
implemented by coalition government, which is effectively controlled by means of
mutual commitments agreed upon beforehand. Although the formal rules to make
coalitions work can in part be derived from the constitution, in a large part they
depend on the resources of each actor (eg the share of the votes; the threat of
non-cooperation and so on). This condition of coalition formation essentially limits
the room to manoeuvre of all participating parties at the level of parliamentary
decision-making. In addition, it requires a certain span of control by governing
parties of their parliamentary delegations, as well as over their electoral followers.
In other words, depending on the weight of a contested `need’ , a party must attempt
to detect complementarity and parallelism at the level of decision-making and must
at the same time remain true to its original preferences in order not to lose its
power-base. Hence, credible commitment and an iterated type of bargaining de® ne
the feasibility of political choice (Scharpf 1998; Tsebelis 1990, 164±8).
The second condition of consociationalism is the representation of most `minor-
ities’ (segments) through bicameralism, functional or territorial decentralisation and
quali® ed rules which safeguard certain collective rights of minorities.
6
These rules
often limit the feasible set of choice open to all actors. This second condition links
the organisation of collective choice to the structure of the state. Elinor Ostrom has
correctly emphasised that its institutional design must be related to the operational
procedures that transform the outcomes of collective decision-making into credible
commitments that can be monitored by all actors (here: minorities) involved
(Ostrom 1990, 51±4).
The third condition of consociationalism is that democratic representation must
mirror society by means of a proportional representation (PR) electoral system in
order to include most relevant societal segments. If not, some of the politically
organised societal cleavages would not be included in the politics of problem-
solving. This formal prerequisite of consociationalism also has an informal
signi® cance: societal actors must be able to organise their own segment politically
in order to govern by means of cooperative behaviour. This makes optimal
decision-making more feasible.
Here, then, we have an institutional framework which mediates con¯ icts in such
a way that many actors involved can play a role in reaching an optimal agreement.
Necessary for the success of such an institutional setting is the recognition by the
actors of the opportunity to pursue their `needs’ in an optimal way, ie collective
choice must lead to discernible pay-offs for all actors involved.
Whether this contention holds true can best be observed in a situation of genuine
sociopolitical con¯ ict. Let us therefore take a closer look at the ® rst amicable
agreement to solve a set of sharp sociopolitical con¯ icts in the Netherlands: the
political stalemate of 1917 (see Lijphart 1975). This illustration demonstrates not
only the potential of a rational institutionalist explanation of a seemingly isolated
event, but also that consociationalism can be seen as a new structure-induced
equilibrium produced by the politics of problem-solving (see also North 1990;
Keman 1996, 1997b; Shepsle 1995; Colomer 1996).
6
These formal rules are developed as a part of the overall need for `checks and balances’ . Often they
tend to function as impediments, in particular if and when the needs are fundamentally contested (see
Schmidt 1996; Braun 1989).
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Table 1. Rank-ordering of needs of Labour, Liberal, Christian parties, before 1917
Needs Labour Liberal Christian
Universal suffrage and PR 1 2 3
Public versus private schooling 3 1( 1 ) 1( 2 )
Welfare regulation 2 3 2
( 1 ) 5 in favour of public schooling only; ( 2 ) 5 in favour of subsidised private schooling.
Rank-order: 1 5 an urgent need; 2 5 important; 3 5 indifference.
In 1917 there were three (blocks of) parties in the Dutch parliament, Labour,
Liberal and Christians each representing equally sized societal minorities. Each
block was in pursuit of urgent societal `needs’ that could only be attained by means
of state intervention (see Table 1). There was no majority party, nor did construc-
tive exchanges appear feasible, owing to the fact that each party used its power of
veto to prevent others ful® lling its need (ie producing voting cycles). The price paid
by each and every party was a sub-optimal outcome. According to Lijphart (1975)
the agreement eventually reached was due to the `common sense of the leadership’
of each `pillar’ and the overwhelming feeling that the national interest was at stake.
Hence a bargain was struck at the elite level and this set a precedent for achieving
compromises by means of the institutional conditionsÐ consociationalismÐ spelled
out in this section (Daalder 1974).
However, the story told in rational institutionalist terms is different: each
political actor representing one of the societal segments had a rational (self)interest
to pursue their own `needs’ regardless of the national interest or accommodation.
Partly because of electoral motives, partly because of ideologically driven motives
(see also Strom 1990), this resulted in a parliamentary stalemate. Because none of
the parties had a simple majority it was strategically rational for each party to
compare its own `needs’ with those of the other two party blocks in order to ® nd
out the degree of parallelism (see n. 6). Each actor knew they could not gain
anything without forming a (temporary) strategic coalition with one of the other
parties in parliament (interdependence) to create a majority. All parties had a
rational understanding of this problem and an optimal mode of conduct developed,
not only based on a one-off trade-off and pay-off, but also on the calculation that
by ® nding an agreement other optimal pay-offs might be realised. The actual
outcome of this process can be traced by looking at the rank-ordering of the `needs’
of each party in the period before 1917, which involved strong party-political
differences over the electoral law, the subsidisation of private (ie non-secular)
schooling, and the degree of welfare statism (based on Lijphart 1975; Daalder
1987; Keman 1993a) (see Table 1).
No agreement was possible as long as the ordering as set out in Table 1 remained
immovable and parliamentary majorities required two out of the three parties. Each
party bloc was big enough to prevent a decision on matters other than their own
preferred need, and hence there was always a threat of a strategic veto by a
blocking coalition. Yet it is also obvious that some of the `needs’ could only be met
if they were considered to be either complementary or parallel. Hardly any
parallelism appears in the rank-orders by each party (schooling ranked high by
Liberals and Christians but in an opposite direction, hence there is a maximum
distance) except regarding welfare regulation for Christians and Labour. The latter
party became in this situation the pivot or broker because it reduced its demand
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with respect to universal suffrage to manhood suffrage (as was demanded by the
Christian block). As no party was vehemently against welfare regulation, it was
possible to develop a package deal in which the remaining sources of con¯ ict could
be handled by means of compromising behaviour. The Liberals had complimentary
goals with Labour on suffrage and the concomitant introduction of a proportional
representation (PR) electoral system. Labour was mildly indifferent to private
schooling (which had nothing to do with elitist education in the Netherlands) and
quite adamant about the extension of welfare regulation.
In short, because complementary and some degree of parallel needs existed
between each party, temporary majorities could be formed on each of the separate
issues. The package deal represented the optimal pay-off for each party and the
only feasible set of political choice as indicated in Table 1. Yet this outcome was
only feasible owing to the fact that the formal rule of simple majority voting on
separate issues could be circumvented in 1917 by means of the package deal. If not,
the stalemate due to veto-voting in parliament would have continued. Had this
situation been a `one-shot game’ , consociationalism as a mode of democratic
decision-making would not have come into existence. However, owing to the
introduction of universal suffrage on the basis of a PR electoral system (in 1919),
the distribution of power resources among the political actors changed. And it was
this constitutional change which turned the practice of consociationalism into a new
set of rules. In other words, the compromise that emerged within the existing room
for manoeuvre brought about institutional change. The new set of rules-in-use
created a different room for manoeuvre for each political actor and led to re-iterated
types of negotiation preceding the process of collective decision-making (Andeweg
1989; Keman 1996).
The actual story of the origins of Dutch consociationalism is less important than
the institutional practices that emanated from it. The crucial point is that the
participants were forced to behave rationally, realising the conditions of interdepen-
dence as well as recognising that optimal pay-offs could be achieved only in terms
of identifying parallel and complimentary `needs’ . Common sense did indeed
prevail, but not because national interest per se, or elite leadership, were crucial
factors. Instead, a new set of formal and informal rules was developed. These
operational rules appeared to work under the condition that no party lost much
more than the others (hence avoiding a sub-optimal outcome for themselves and
preventing maximal results for others). Thus the stability of the political order was
enhanced.
By using concepts derived from rational institutionalism, it is possible to
interpret the development of the consociational theme in a more structured way
than hitherto done: the concepts of political room to manoeuvre and feasibility
of choice appear useful in helping us understand how contradictory situations of
societal con¯ ict can be turned into agreement and subsequent political consensus.
By employing the notions of complementary and parallel ordering of `needs’ it is
possible to detect the underlying mechanism that enables actors to achieve an
equilibrium within the existing institutional context. As a result it can be argued
that consociationalism is not a different type of democracy or a deviant case, but
one of the existing forms of democratic regime, it is not a unique development as
most analysts of consociationalism (eg Lehmbruch 1967; Daalder 1974; Steiner
1974) tend to argue.
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Corporatism
Unlike consociationalism, corporatism is a relatively recent development in the
relations between politics and society. Although some authors trace it from
the 1930s or see it as an immediate postwar phenomenon (eg Katzenstein 1985)
most consider it a political±institutional arrangement that has emerged since the
worldwide stag¯ ation crisis started (around the mid-1970s; Schmidt 1982; Czada
1987; Keman 1988; Braun 1989).
Corporatism is de® ned as a more or less loosely organised system of tripartite
interest-representation aiming at concerted political action to avert the conse-
quences of economic crisis (Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Keman 1989; Braun
1989; Visser and Hemerijck 1997, 63±80). The three central actors are: govern-
ment, organised capital and labour. What interests us here is not whether
`corporatism’ exists or matters politically (see, for example, Schmidt 1982; Ther-
born 1987; Lijphart and CreÂpaz 1991; Woldendorp 1995), but rather to what extent
this type of interest-intermediation can be understood in terms of rational institu-
tionalism, ie as a structure-induced response to economic conditions which
promotes an optimal level of problem-solving.
As with consociationalism, corporatism entails a decision-making structure that
is by and large de® ned by (informal) codes of conduct. However, in contrast to
consociationalism, it concerns two societal actors who are not primarily organised
to operate politically. They rather operate on the borders of the parliamentary
system. Under consociationalism, however vehement competition between and
among parties may be, party-political actors pursue similar overall goals: of® ce-
and vote-seeking, policy enactments and political resources (Strom 1990; Keman
1997b). In contrast, the main societal agents within a corporatist framework are
`natural’ (class) enemies and have therefore fundamentally different urgent `needs’
but pursue similar measures. At the same time, they are strongly interdependent,
since the one cannot function without the other (ie in a market economy). Hence,
in order to avoid zero-sum outcomes, which would be detrimental to all partici-
pants, certain institutions are expected to direct rational behaviour and produce
outcomes bene® cial to all of them (Scharpf 1992).
Corporatism is thus an institutionalised form of socioeconomic con¯ ict-regulation,
and ought to be seen as a bargaining process involving material exchanges to enhance
public welfare (ie a stable economy). The degree of success is then measured by the
pay-offs to each participant from the ® nal agreement. This result should be devoid of
zero-sum results and conducive to optimal outcomes (see also Scharpf 1987;
Lehmbruch 1984; Braun 1989; Czada 1987; Woldendorp 1995; Keman 1996).
Corporatism is therefore a variable which is predominantly dependent on the feasible
policy choices open to each participant and the room to manoeuvre which each of
them has. Let us therefore consider which rule con® gurations as well as sets of
(negotiable) `needs’ can be identi® ed with respect to corporatism. Again, the Nether-
lands will serve as an illustration (Braun 1989; Woldendorp 1995; Keman 1997b).
A basic condition of corporatism is that negotiations take place on a voluntary
basis and that only those organised actors have access who can be trusted to
represent the majority of their membership (and oblige that majority to accept the
outcomes of the negotiations). The more this is so, the more likely a corporatist
arrangement is likely to emerge not just once, but repeatedly under the condition
that pay-offs are by and large equally perceived.
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Another condition relates to the `collective action’ problem: corporatism works
under the condition of no-exclusion of those that are included. Every participant
has a potential veto: unanimous decision-making is a logical consequence of the
development of concerted action (Axelrod 1984; Laver 1986). This implies that
the agreement reached must be optimal for the actors involved. But it may be
sub-optimal regarding the attainment or maintenance of public welfare for the
nation as a whole (compare the Olsonian argument with respect to distributional
coalitions and corporatism: Olson 1986).
A third condition is that the results of corporatist bargaining need to be
sanctioned by parliamentary approval, which to some extent constrains the room to
manoeuvre of party-government in the bargaining process. This practice implies a
`politicisation’ of corporatism because it is also dependent on parliamentary
consent and in some cases this process has been formalised with respect to the role
of corporatist institutions.7
All in all the institutional mode of corporatism is characterised by conditions that
enhance cooperative behaviour between actors. It is made possible because actors
have few exit opportunities. On the other hand, tripartism also enlarges the room
to manoeuvre for the actors representing capital and labour as they are attributed
a semi-public status (ie they are recognised as participants in the process of
collective choice; see also Offe 1979; Keman 1989). The role of representative
government is important in this respect as a legitimising body and it can contribute
to the bargaining process by providing public goods to further an optimal pay-off
to the other actors (eg by means of making the agreement legally binding). As there
are so few formal rules laying down the conditions for a collective effort,
particularly in the ® eld of socioeconomic policy with adversarial `needs’ , the active
involvement of government is crucial. The feasible set of policy options available
is often limited and thus the right conditions for problem-solving are vital.
The feasibility of political choice depends on the objective economic situation
(ie economic development) and the rank-ordering of (urgent) `needs’ as envisaged
by each participant. First of all, the way the societal actors view the economic crisis
is important, and their view will not only in¯ uence their ordering of preferences,
but also the extent to which they are considered as immutable. Second, the
bargaining process can only be successful if all participants see it as an iterative
game. This implies the expectation of all actors involved that the negotiations will
be repeated over time which allows actors to take up and abandon positions in turn
to ® nd agreement (Taylor 1987; Scharpf 1998).
In contrast to the game that is played under consociational conditions, all actors
have the same list of `needs’ but (almost by de® nition) differ on their functional
weight. For instance, active labour-market policy has a different weight for capital,
labour and party-government. Employers’ organisations are mostly interested in an
adequate (qualitative) labour supply, whereas trade unions tend to stress the effects
of the existing rate of unemployment in terms of income.
8
Finally, governments use
7
In some countries, eg Austria and the Netherlands, this process has been formalised to some extent:
in The Netherlands by laying down that government must take the advice of the Social Economic Council
(until 1995), and in Austria through the ParitaÈ tischen Kommission which gives binding advice on wage
rates and price control (Woldendorp 1997).
8
In The Netherlands the average wage rate of an industrial worker is directly related to the level of
unemployment bene® ts. Hence trade unions tend to safeguard their members’ income by maintaining
wage levels rather than by attempting to in¯ uence the level of social security bene® ts directly.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
1:
02
 1
 J
un
e 
20
11
POLITICAL STABILITY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 263
Table 2. Rank-ordering of needs of government, capital and labour
Needs Government Capital Labour
Active labour-market policy 1 2 3
Statutory wage rates 3 1( 2 ) 1( 1 )
Social security bene® ts 2 3 2
( 1 ) 5 in favour of higher wage rates; ( 2 ) 5 in favour of lower wage rates.
Rank-order: 1 5 an urgent need; 2 5 important; 3 5 indifference.
labour-market policy not only as an (indirect) means to prevent high levels of
unemployment, but also to avoid a negative in¯ uence on popularity (Whiteley
1986). The same line of reasoning can be developed for other itemsÐ for instance
for economic-related `needs’ , such as the development of wage rates in relation to
the extension of social security bene® ts (Braun 1989; Keman 1989; Visser and
Hemerijck 1997). Given this complex pattern of similar economic `needs’ with a
different weight for each actor, the notions of parallelism and, in particular,
complementarity become important as they will indicate the feasibility of viable
agreements between the actors involved. It is important to note this, because the
institutionalisation of corporatist arrangements focuses on a single issue problem,
whereas consociationalism is a procedure to ® nd an equilibrium with respect to
multifarious issues. Table 2 sets out a plausible rank-ordering of economic `needs’
(see also Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Woldendorp 1995).
The ordering shown in Table 2 is highly adversarial regarding one item: the
development of statutory wage rates. This gives governments an important role in
achieving agreement among the social partners. Yet, in order to maintain the
corporatist arrangement it is not only necessary to settle wage rates, but also to
compensate the societal actors given their `needs’ . It is obvious, following this
example, that, again, the solution is dependent on a government which formally
controls the regulation of social security and can interfere in wage settlements in
the Netherlands. This means that party-government in the Netherlands is the only
actor which can mediate the con¯ ict of interests between the other actors and
develop a viable agreement. If the above holds true, how can the working
of corporatism be explained as a mechanism to produce a structure-induced
equilibrium by means of rational institutionalist arguments?
First, it must be noted that the actors involved are functionally different but
fundamentally interdependent (de® ning the room to manoeuvre). Corporatism is a
rational strategy for all the actors involved in their search for optimal trade-offs.
Instead of analysing Table 2 horizontally (as was done regarding the interactions
between parties in consociationalism), it should be examined vertically (ie in regard
to the feasibility of policy choices for each actor). The question is: to what extent
is it possible for each actor to change their ordering of needs (the feasibility set)
in order to reach an agreement which makes no one worse off and is credible for
its own members? The following exchange emerges and makes cooperative
behaviour possible: the need for higher wages can be modi® ed by increasing social
security bene® ts (as a kind of `social wage’ ). Active labour-market policy can be
adjusted to balance demand and supply to the need of all actors, since it is by and
large complementary for all actors. In actual fact, given that corporatist arrange-
ments do work on the basis of give and take as well as taking it in turns to make
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concessions over time, it may be that a low graded `need’ (3) is an asset for an
actor to bargain for an optimal agreement on a highly graded one (trading off).
Therefore it may be expected that governments will forego direct constraints on
wages and social security to ensure cooperation regarding labour-market policies.
According to many observers, Visser and Hemerijck (1997) for instance, Dutch
governments behaved strategically in this way during the 1980s (when they were
dominated by the Christian Democrats; see also Hemerijck and van Kersbergen
1997). It was only in the 1990s that the option of the active labour market became
the cornerstone of the `Dutch miracle’ .
If government, the pivotal actor within a corporatist arrangement, does not
follow such a strategy by de® ning the room to manoeuvre, it will be confronted by
a non-cooperative coalition. This has on occasions been the case in The Nether-
lands. Dutch governments attempted to reduce wage drift as well as curb social
security bene® ts (in 1980/81 and again in 1989/90; Bran 1989; Woldendorp 1995).
This resulted in a lack of concerted action and a steep increase in unemployment.
Only after this policy direction was abandoned has general agreement again been
possible in the NetherlandsÐ based on complementarity on active labour-market
policy and reducing social securityÐ and concerted action feasible (Keman 1993a,
1996; Woldendorp 1995). Hence, instead of welfare for work, the shared or parallel
need became jobs for welfare (Hemerijck and van Kersbergen 1997). The famous
`Dutch miracle’ which now seems to have cured the equally well-known `Dutch
disease’ is the result of a reordering by `needs’ of the actors involved. Yet, and this
is my claim, it could not have occurred had there not been a rule con® guration (ie
corporatism) that allowed for an alternative choice, ie a structure-induced equilib-
rium.
9
This process of exchange and substituting of the priorities of each actor can be
considered as a rational abstention from maximising one’ s own needs. The
interdependence of the social partners affects the feasibility of choice, which in
turn is dictated by the room for manoeuvre of each and everyone. Since defection
is dif® cult, the room for manoeuvre depends on the role played by government
(unless the social partners decide to cooperate regardless of their prioritised
`needs’ ).The extent to which corporatism will work is thus dependent on institu-
tionalising tripartite collective decision-making. The actual working and conti-
nuity of such an arrangement depends on whether the bargaining game is
perceived rationally when it comes to de® ning the exchange patterns and on
whether institutionalised behaviour allows for iterative plays rather than being a
one-shot game. Again, as with my criticism of consociationalism, corporatism
does not solely occur in certain countries due to speci® c historical circumstances
(see, for example, Katzenstein 1985) or to common sense and policy learning (eg
Visser and Hemerijck 1997), but rather as a result of rational action within a
¯ exible institutional setting allowing for optimal outcomes each and every time. In
my view, corporatism should be understood as a result of rational behaviour
9
Compare this logic with that of Scharpf (1998) where he explains an optimal outcome by means of
the `Battle of the Sexes’ game, which he labels as a `problem-solving style of decision-making’
(pp. 56±8). However, in his view the equilibrium is only possible by repeating the game and to redistribute
the pay-offs over time. In my view the institutional structure allows for changing outcomes during each
game played.
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taking into account the institutional context and circumstances allowing for an
optimal outcome.
Concluding Remarks
The descriptive analysis of consociationalism and corporatism has contributed to
the understanding of how sharp societal con¯ ict turns into a viable political
consensus. Agreements that can be reached between adversarial or con¯ icting
actors depend on the feasibility of choice which, in turn, can be derived from the
rank-ordering of the (urgent) `needs’ of each actor. In the case of consociational-
ism, where the room for manoeuvre is more formally de® ned, unrelated issues can
be exchanged. Such exchanges can assist decision-making through cooperation in
parliament, which depends on the degree of parallelism in their needs recognised
by all parties during negotiations. This mutual understanding helps to ® nd workable
and sustainable compromises and avoids stalemates. In the case of corporatism, the
room for manoeuvre is by and large de® ned by party-government, and the `needs’ ,
as de® ned by the actors, are strongly interrelated. Here the exchange is more
dependent on the ordering by each actor. Only certain combinations of `needs’
ordered by each actor on the basis of complementarity will lead to a package deal
which is acceptable to all and which can be implemented by concerted action. By
characterising actors in relation to their (urgent) `needs’ and considering institutions
as intervening variables that shape the room to manoeuvre, we can understand the
paradoxical relation between societal con¯ icts and the development of political
consensus as regards the feasibility of shared policy choices.
In this article I have attempted to combine institutionalist arguments with
arguments originating from rational choice theory. I consider institutions as
particularly crucial in the study of politics, but only if analysed in relation to actors
and their `needs’ . Institutions come and (sometimes) go, and shape the political
interactions in modern society: the structure of the polity is therefore the principal
intervening variable between politics and policies (Keman 1998; but see also
Scharpf 1992; HeÂritier 1998; Laver 1997). By de® ning and elaborating on the basic
elements and working of institutional arrangements with respect to democratic
politics, I have identi® ed a plausible line of advance for research in this area. The
two concepts that I have proposedÐ the actor’ s room for manoeuvre and his or her
set of politically feasible choicesÐ represent a step forward. In particular they are
useful when analysing under which circumstances a structure-induced equilibrium
is more likely to develop (Scharpf 1998; Shepsle 1995).
The other aim has been to relate my a priori arguments to existing concepts in
political science: consociationalism and corporatism. These concepts are a chal-
lenge to any student of comparative politics, since both concepts appear able to
explain paradoxical relationships which do not ® t general pluralist democratic
theory. The question of how political stability comes about in the existing studies
has been, however, too speci® c and contextually driven. Traditional approaches
to consociationalism and corporatism are restricted by their descriptive
analyses which are insuf® cient to explain the paradox of con¯ ict and consensus
in a more general fashion. They lack an overarching theoretical argument. This
makes it dif® cult to apply the concepts to comparable cases, be it cross-nationally
or over time. A rational institutional approach may well do a better job in this
respect.
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